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replaced with a link to the accepted article once it is live. Referencing this version of the article should 
follow the format: 
Hobson, Jonathan (2018) “Prosecuting Lemkin’s concept of Genocide: successes and controversies”, 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: an International Journal, Pre-acceptance version 
 
Abstract: 
This paper is an exploration of genocide prosecutions since the inception of the term in 1944 by Raphael 
Lemkin, its legal definition by the United Nations in 1948, and the eventual establishing of the 
International Criminal Court in 1998. The paper is in three parts. The first part examines the history of 
genocide legislation, particularly the international legal frameworks established since Lemkin first 
devised the term in 1944. The second part details, for the first time, the extent of genocide prosecutions 
to date. To do so, it employs material from various international criminal tribunals, the International 
Criminal Court, national courts, and media accounts contemporary with the events. The final part 
illustrates the politics involved in genocide prosecutions, using a case study of the International Criminal 
Court’s involvement in Africa and the failed extradition of Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir. The case 
study uses a range of secondary sources, including documents from the ICC, the African Union, National 
Governments, and other contemporary accounts. Overall, the paper argues that despite some successes 
in prosecuting genocide and the deterrent effects of international tribunals and courts, the international 
community has not yet been able to stop what Lemkin described over 70 years ago as “an old practice in 
its modern development”. 
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Introduction 
As a term, genocide is a relatively recent concept, devised by the lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944 as a 
response to the organised, mechanised, and institutionalised killings that were an integral part of the 
Nazi regime during the Second World War. For Lemkin, Genocide was “an old practice in its modern 
development”.1 It was not that the killings were necessarily greater in number than previous events of 
mass murder, or that the cultural imperialism they reflected was a new phenomenon in Europe. Rather, 
that the systems, structures, and technologies of modernity enabled the Nazis to undertake a process of 
isolation, denigration, and destruction in a more organised and orchestrated way that had happened 
previously. The destruction, not limited to  but particularly targeted at the Jewish population of 
occupied Europe saw systematic abuse, disempowerment, cultural destruction, and, eventually, the 
murder of millions, many in purpose-built death camps. For Lemkin, this industrialisation of the 
processes of discrimination and killing required a new language:  
 “new conceptions require new terms. By genocide we mean the destruction of a nation or 
ethnic group … a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of essential 
foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of the destruction of the group 
themselves”.2 
Genocide is more than mass murder and cultural and economic domination: it is the biological, cultural, 
and social disintegration of a targeted group. In his work detailing the new terminology of genocide, 
Lemkin3 describes the “techniques of genocide” in different spheres of human existence, and 
particularly in relation to the conditions of life brought to bear on Jews in Nazi Germany. For Lemkin, the 
                                                          
1 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal for redress 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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Nazi genocide was a planned and deliberate attempt to undermine and then destroy the Jewish 
population in all aspects of life: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and 
moral. It was, as he described it, “an elaborate, almost scientific system, developed to an extent never 
before achieved by any nation.”4 
Subsequently codified by the United Nations in 1951, Genocide has become the focus of several 
international courts including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
1993, the Interterminal criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) founded in 1998.  These legal bodies represent a voice for the international community and a 
statement of intent when it comes to collective action on the continued perpetration of a crime that will 
“shock the conscience of humanity.”5  
The international bodies responsible for prosecuting genocide are not without their critics. For instance, 
the professor of international Law, William Schabas,6 identifies issues with the definitions of genocide 
used in international legislation. Barria and Roper7 are sceptical on the impact of the early international 
tribunals in both prosecuting individuals and in contributing to more lasting peace in the regions.  There 
are also critiques on the role that the International Criminal Court in sovereign states, particularly in 
Africa, where Abdul Tejan-Cole8 argues that the work of the ICC in Africa has opened it up to criticisms of 
neo-colonialism on that continent. This is a position taken by the African Union, who have persistently 
criticized the ICCs involvement in African Affairs and have gone as far as to recommend that its member 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 ICC. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” (2002) 
6 William Schabas. “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008). 
7 Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, “How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and 
the CTR” International Journal of Human Rights, 9, no. 3 (2005), 349-368. 
8Abdul Tejan-Cole, “Is the ICC’s exclusively African case docket a legitimate and appropriate intervention or an 
unfair targeting of Africans?” in Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. 
Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 366-379 
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states do not comply with ICC arrest warrants. Nevertheless, many argue that the international tribunals 
and the ICC have had a significant and positive impact. For instance, Hyearn and Simmons9, Bassiouni 
and Hansen10, and Hillebrecht11 all see the prosecutions and the wider work of the international 
tribunals and courts as an opportunity to establish international norms around prosecuting genocide, 
changing habits and deterring, or at least dampening the extent of future genocidal events. This paper 
examines the impact of international efforts towards prosecuting genocide, considering the legislative 
journey the crime has been through, the prosecutions for genocide to date, and the difficulties around 
the politicization of the international courts.  
Structure and data 
The paper is in three parts. The first part examines the history of genocide legislation, in particular the 
international legal frameworks established since Lemkin first devised the term in 1944. The second part 
details the extent of genocide prosecutions to date, employing material from various international 
criminal tribunals, the ICC, national courts, and, where necessary, media accounts contemporary with 
the events. The final part of the paper illustrates the politics involved in genocide prosecutions through 
a case study of ICC involvement in Africa and the failed extradition of Sudanese president Omar Al 
Bashir. The case study uses a range of secondary sources, including documents from the ICC, the African 
Union, National Governments, and other contemporary accounts. 
                                                          
9 Jo Hyeran and Beth Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” International 
Organization, 70, (2016), 443-475. 
10 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen, “The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the Prosecutor” 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 309-325 
11 Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya 
International Interactions Vol. 42 , Iss. 4, (2016), 616-643 
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Legislating Genocide: from Lemkin to the ICC 
The first significant appearance of the term genocide after Lemkin’s inception of the term in 1944 was 
during the trials in Nuremburg and Tokyo after the Second World War. These trials were based on two 
important pieces of legislation: the “Charter of the International Military Tribunal”, which was presented 
in June 1945 and formed the basis for the trials of Nazi party members at Nuremburg12; and in 
September 1945, the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter”, which was the basis for 
trials of Japanese prisoners in Tokyo. The subsequent prosecutions were  in-part the realisation of the 
“Moscow Declaration” (and subsequent “London agreement”, both more commonly associated with the 
establishment of the United Nations) signed on October 30th, 1943 on behalf of the Governments of the 
United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. These declarations promised a 
“rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace 
and security”13.  
The legislation adopted as part of the trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo were important for several 
reasons. Common to both trials was a list of three crimes: Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes 
Against Humanity14, one of the first occasions on which such serious acts of widespread violence, 
aggression, and destruction were codified at an international level. Although the term genocide was not 
listed as a crime at either trial, it was referred to during the hearings. More broadly, both trials 
contributed to the concept of achievable international justice and standards around serious crimes that 
constituted violations of individual and collective liberties.  The Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal included a series of “Principles of International Law” that were subsequently adopted by the 
                                                          
12 United Nations. “The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis: Memorandum 
submitted by the Secretary-General.” (2016a) 
13 United Nations. “The yearbook of the United Nations 1946-17.” (2016b) 
14 United Nations. “The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis: Memorandum 
submitted by the Secretary-General.” (2016a) 
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International Law Commission of the United Nations, in 1950.15 This codified the three crimes 
considered at Nuremburg and Tokyo into international statute and set out the criteria for holding to 
account those responsible. It also sought to determine several questions of international criminal 
jurisdiction, including for the crime of “genocide”, specifically: 
…the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of 
persons, charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred 
upon that organ by international convention.16 
The inclusion of the term genocide in the text from the International Law Commission was a significant 
milestone in the recognition and management of the crime. At the same time as Nuremburg, in Tokyo 
the United Nations was running a parallel conference debating Lemkin’s term genocide in relation to the 
crimes committed in the Far East during the Second World War. This conference culminated in the 
“Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, which was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and enacted in law 12 January 1951.17 This 
legislation, based on the work of Lemkin, defined Genocide in legal terms as: 
… any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(e) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
                                                          
15 United Nations. “Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries, 1950.” (2005) 
16 Ibid. 
17 United Nations. “CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE.” (2016c) 
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bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(f) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.18 
The “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide” was the first human rights treaty 
adopted by the United Nations General assembly. It uses much of the same language and precedents set 
out in the “Principles of International Law” recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
particularly around the culpability of perpetrators and the responsibility of the international community 
in prosecuting the crime. 
Although there is some evidence to show that the term genocide was used in at least one successful 
prosecution before 1990, in Equatorial Guinea (as detailed in next section of this paper), it is generally 
accepted that the legislation governing genocide was not acted upon, certainly at an international level, 
until the early 1990s when the United Nations used the Genocide Convention to establish the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR). There are 
several reasons for this period of inactivity, chief among them was the international paralysis caused by 
the Cold War, lack of consensus across the UN, and, as Schabas19 points out, a practical difficulty in that 
“the Genocide Convention does not establish a monitoring mechanism”. Nevertheless, in 1993 the 
United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia20 with a 
mandate to prosecute those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law during 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations 
                                                          
18 United Nations. “CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE.” (2016c), 
278 
19William Schabas, “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law (2008) 
20 ICTY. “Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” (2009) 
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of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Then, in 1994 following the 
brutal and violent civil war, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), charged with prosecuting a similar range of crimes (UNHCR 2016). The ICTR ended its 
work on December 25, 2015, whilst that of the ICTY continues. 
Although the ICTY and ICTR were the first international use of the genocide conventions, Schabas21 is 
somewhat circumspect about the application of the legislation in these courts, describing “a restrictive 
approach to interpretation of the definition of genocide, which was made evident in the two ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda”. This critique is supported by Barria and Roper,22 who 
identify a range of difficulties with ICTY and ICTR, for example that some of the “problems of the 
tribunals are due to the nature of international humanitarian law and their broad mandate.”23 This is not 
to say that these tribunals were without merit; it is important to note that they did signify a willingness 
on the part of the international community to focus on some of the most extreme cases of state-
sanctioned and organized violence.  Nevertheless, it was some of the perceived failings of the ICTY and 
ICTR that were part of the “primary justifications for the creation of an International Criminal Court”24 as 
a more permeant body to oversee the prosecution of the crime of genocide. 
Enacted on 1 July 2002, the Rome Statue established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with 
jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes, “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community”.25  The ICC is funded on a similar model to the UN, where 
contributions are based roughly on member states’ GDP. 18 judges are elected by the Assembly of States 
                                                          
21 William Schabas, “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law. (2008), 4 
22 Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, “How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and 
the CTR” International Journal of Human Rights, 9, no. 3 (2005), 349-368. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 ICC. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” (2002) 
This is a Pre-proof version of the article - Hobson (2018) Prosecuting Lemkin’s concept of Genocide: successes and controversies 
 
 
ix 
 
Parties for nine years, currently: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, France, 
Poland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, and Republic of Korea, the Philippines.26 Investigations are initiated 
based on a referral from the UN Security Council, from a petition by a State, or through an ICC investigation 
initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor.27 The next section of this paper details the successes of genocide 
prosecution worldwide, providing the sum of prosecutions to date and the organisations or bodies 
responsible for those prosecutions.  
Prosecuting Genocide: contested success 
As of January 01, 2018, there have been 150 identifiable prosecutions for genocide, although in 7 cases 
those found guilty were subsequently acquitted. These are prosecutions that have listed genocide as at 
least one of the offenses for which an individual has been found guilty. In many cases there are other 
offenses alongside genocide convictions, most commonly Crimes against Humanity or grave breaches of 
the international laws governing war (i.e. serious breaches of the Geneva Convention), however these are 
not detailed in these lists.  The convictions for genocide are organised into three groups: those pursuant 
to the war in the Rwanda (Table 1); those pursuant to the war in the former Yugoslavia (Table 2); and a 
small number of cases across the rest of the world, including those from the ICC (Table 3). In the first two 
groups many of the convictions came through the work of the ICTY and ICTY. Despite the criticisms of 
these courts, they both have successfully prosecuted individuals for the crime of genocide, with the ICTR 
is responsible for the largest number of individual genocide trials, and for 59 convictions.  
                                                          
26 ICC. “Judicial Divisions: Who’s Who” (2018a) 
27 ICC. “Understanding the International Criminal Court.” (2016a), 17 
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Each table lists convictions in that group by prosecuting body and in chronological order, combining 
convictions together where prosecuting bodies have done so. The tables identify the specific crime for 
which individuals were convicted, the sentence they received, and whether that sentence was reduced, 
commuted or overturned on appeal. Each table is followed by some discussion on issues of importance. 
Where sentences are listed as ‘Life’ this reflects the term given by the specific court and may vary 
depending on the legislation used in each case. 
 
Table 1: Genocide prosecutions pursuant to the war in Rwanda 
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction 
(i) Genocide  
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide 
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide  
(iv) Complicity in genocide 
Prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Date  Name(s)  Conviction  Sentence  
Sept 1998 Jean-Paul Akayesu (i) (iii) Life 
Sept 1998 Jean Kambanda (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Life 
Feb 1999 Omar Serushago (i) 15 years 
May 1999 Clément Kayishema ; Obed Ruzindana (i) Life ; 25 years (respectively) 
Dec 1999 Georges Rutaganda (i) life 
Jan 2000 Alfred Musema (i) Life  
June 2000 Georges Ruggiu (iii) 12 years 
Feb 2003 Elizaphan Ntakirutimana ;  Gérard 
Ntakirutimana 
(i) 10 years and 25 years 
(respectively) 
May 2003 Eliézer Niyitegeka (i) (ii) (iii) life 
May 2003  Laurent Semanza (iv) 35 years 
Dec 2003 Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza ; Ferdinand 
Nahimana ; Hassan Ngeze  
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 32 ; 30 ; 35 years (respectively) 
Dec 2003 Juvénal Kajelijeli (i) (iii) 45 years 
Jan 2004  Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda (i) (iii) Life  
Feb 2004  Samuel Imanishimw (i) 12 years 
June 2004  Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (i)  30 years 
July 2004 Emmanuel Ndindabahizi (i) Life  
April 2005 Mikaeli Muhimana (i) Life 
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Dec 2005 Aloys Simba (i) 25 years 
Dec 2006 Athanase Seromba (i) Life 
Dec 2007 François Karera (i) Life  
Nov 2008  Siméon Nchamihigo (i) 40 years 
Dec 2008  Théoneste Bagosora ; Aloys Ntabakuze ; 
Anatole Nsengiyumva 
(i) 35 years each (Nsengiyumva 
reduced to 15 years on appeal) 
Dec 2008 Simon Bikindi (iii) 15 years 
Dec 2008  Protais Zigiranyirazo (i) Life (subsequently acquitted) 
Nov 2008  Siméon Nchamihigo (i) 40 years 
Feb 2009 Emmanuel Rukundo (i) 23 years 
June 2009 Callixte Kalimanzira (i) (iii) 25 years 
July 2009 Tharcisse Renzaho (i) life 
Sept 2009 Michel Bagaragaza (iv)  8 years 
Feb 2010  Tharcisse Muvunyi (iii) 15 years 
Feb 2010 Ephrem Setako (i) 25 years 
July 2010 Yussuf Munyakazi (i) 25 years 
Aug 2010  Dominique Ntawukulilyayo (i) 20 years 
Nov 2010 Gaspard Kanyarukiga (i) 30 years 
Dec 2010 Ildephonse Hategekimana (i) Life 
Mar  2011 Jean Baptiste Gatete (i) 40 years 
May 2011  Augustin Ndindiliyimana ; Augustin 
Bizimungu 
(i) 11 years (subsequently 
acquitted); 30 years 
(respectively) 
June 2011  Pauline Nyiramasuhuko; Arsène Shalom 
Ntahobali ; Sylvain Nsabimana; Alphonse 
Nteziryayo; Joseph kanyabashi; Élie 
Ndayambaje 
(i) Life, life, 25, 30, 35, life 
(subsequently acquitted) 
(respectively) 
Sept 2011 Justin MugenzI ; Prosper Mugiraneza (ii) (iii)  30 years each (both 
subsequently acquitted) 
Dec 2011 Grégoire Ndahimana (i) 25 years 
Feb 2012 Édouard Karemera ; Matthieu Ngirumpats (i) (ii) (iii) Life 
May 2012 Callixte Nzaboniman (i) (ii) (iii) life 
June 2012 Ildéphonse Nizeyimana (i) 35 years 
June 2012 Joseph Serugendo (iii) 6 years 
Dec 2012 Augustin Ngirabatware (i) (iii) 30 years 
Other prosecutions for Genocide committed in Rwanda 
Date  Name(s) and prosecutor Conviction  Sentence  
Feb 1997 Froduald Karamira 
Court of First Instance of Kigali, Rwanda 
(i) death 
June 2001  Vincent Nteziman ; lphonse Higaniro; Sister 
Gertrude (a.k.a. Consolata Mukangango) 
;  Sister Kisito  a.k.a. Julienne Mukabutera) 
(i) 12 years; 20 years; 15 years; 12 
years (respectively) 
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Boutare Four trial: Assize Court , Belgium 
Nov 2006 Wenceslas  Munyeshyaka (tried in absentia) 
Rwandan Military Court, Kigali 
(i) Life  
Mar 2009 Béatrice Nirere 
“Gagcaca” Court of Giporoso, Gasabo 
District, Rwanda  
(i) life 
Oct 2009 Désiré Munyaneza 
Superior Court, Criminal Division, Canada 
(i) life 
Dec 2009 Valérie Bemeriki 
“Gagcaca” Court of Nyakabanda, Kigali, 
Rwanda 
(i) Life  
June 2010 François Bazaramba 
District Court of Porvoo, Finland 
(i) Life  
Mar 2014 Pascal Simbikangwa 
The Assize Court of Paris, France 
(iv) 25 years 
Dec 2015 Jean Uwinkindi - 
Rwandan High court 
(i) life 
April 2017 Bernard Munyagishari 
Rwandan High Court 
(i) Life  
 
As table 1 shows, as well as a considerable number of trials conducted by the ICTR, the Rwandan 
Government in various courts also tried those responsible for Genocide. Although the most evidenced 
cases are shown in table 1, this is by no means the sum of trials relating to genocide offenses in Rwanda. 
Between 1997 and 2004, 10,026 cases tried by the national courts system under a new form of “Organic 
Law”, devised specifically to deal with the post-genocide trials28. Organic law split cases into four 
categories, with the most serious, Category 1, referring directly to those “whose criminal acts or criminal 
participation place among planners, organisers, imitators, supervisors of the crime of genocide or crime 
against humanity”29, some of these are captured in the table above. Categories 2, 3, and 4 include crimes 
                                                          
28 Leo c Nwoye, “Partners or Rivals in Reconciliation? The ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts” San Diego 
International Law Journal, Vol 16 no. 1 (2014), 119-208 
29 Rwandan Transitional National Assembly. “ORGANIC LAW N0 40/2000 OF 26/01/2001. (2000). 
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where the accused are complicit, accomplices, or perpetrators of acts of violence associated to crimes 
that may include genocide.  
Given the difficulties of trying the substantial number of those incarcerated and awaiting trial, in 2004 the 
Rwandan government developed the Gacaca system of localised, community trials that were a “relatively 
informal, traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that was adapted to meet the discerned 
needs of the post-genocide environment.”30 The Gacaca courts dealt predominantly with category 2, 3 
and 4 cases under Organic Law, and Nwoye31 describes the process as “a result of the domestic system’s 
inability to deal with the huge number of back-logged genocide cases promptly”.  According to Human 
Rights Watch, of the roughly 818,000 individuals accused of crimes in the initial Gacaca phase between 
2004-5, 77,000 were initially placed in Organic Law category 1 to be tried in the national court system, 
with the remainder of the cases sent to the Gacaca courts.32 As of April 2012, approximately 1,951,388 
cases had been tried in the Gacaca system, with a conviction rate running around 65%.  The trials of 
political and military leaders for acts of genocide are generally well documented and included in Table 1, 
however there are a multitude of other crimes associated with the genocide, such as the localised support, 
complicity, and/or conspiracy to commit genocide that are not included in official figures but were part of 
national or Gacaca trials. Therefore, it is very difficult to provide a firm number of the broader set of 
convictions related to genocide that came from these processes, but it is certain that many individuals 
were convicted of such crimes. 
                                                          
30 Leo C Nwoye, “Partners or Rivals in Reconciliation? The ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts” San Diego 
International Law Journal, Vol 16 no. 1 (2014), 119-208 
31 Ibid. 
32 Human Rights Watch. “Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda.” (2008) 
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As with the war in Rwanda, the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia resulted in convictions for crimes of 
genocide. Table 2 shows these convictions, including those rating to the ICTY and convictions from other 
courts.  
Table 2: Genocide prosecutions pursuant to the war in the former Yugoslavia 
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction 
(i) Genocide  
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide 
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide  
(iv) Complicity in genocide 
(v) Aiding and abetting genocide 
Prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Date  Name(s)  Conviction  Sentence  
April 2004 Radislav Krstić (v) 35 years 
June 2010 Vujadin Popović (i) (ii) Life 
June 2010 Ljubiša Beara (i) Life 
June 2010 Drago Nikolić (v) 35 years 
Dec 2012 Zdravko Tolimir (i) (ii) Life 
Mar 2016 Radovan Karadžić (i) 40 years 
Nov 2017 Ratko Mladić (i) Life 
Other prosecution for Genocide committed in the former Yugoslavia 
Date  Name and prosecutor Conviction  Sentence  
Sept 1997 Nikola Jorgić 
German Higher Court 
(i) Life 
Mar 1993 Borislav Herak 
Sarajevo Military District Court 
(i) Death (subsequently revised to 
20 years) 
Mar 1993 Sretko Damjanović  
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War 
Crimes Chamber 
(i) Death (subsequently acquitted) 
Nov 1999 Maksim Sokolović 
German Higher Court 
(v) 9 years 
Oct 2009 Milorad Trbić 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War 
Crimes Chamber 
(i) 30 years 
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Although the ICTR and ICTY are responsible for the largest number of identifiable genocide convictions, 
there have been convictions across the rest of the world. The first convictions for genocide are often 
credited to the ICTY and ICTR, however almost 20 years earlier, in 1979, there were several successful 
prosecutions for Genocide arising from the military coup in Equatorial Guinea. These prosecutions are 
often discounted over questions on the legality of the court and the legal basis used to define Genocide.  
The trial in Equatorial Guinea used a definition for genocide developed a few years earlier in a Spanish 
military court, and although the Spanish case was ultimately dismissed, the supreme military court of 
Equatorial Guinea used this definition as part of their prosecution of the former president and six other 
high-ranking officials in a set of trials after the coup.  The sole international observer of the trial, Alejandro 
Artucio who was present on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, cast doubt on the trial for 
“a series of irregularities” during the proceedings33. He argues that the charges of genocide were not 
legally valid as Equatorial Guinea had not ratified the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment 
of genocide. Furthermore, he argues that the charges of genocide, particularly the intent to destroy a 
religions, national or racial group, were not proven in the case, but rather the terms “’genocide and mass 
murder’ were used synonymously”.34 Nevertheless, the neglect of the Equatorial Guinea case represents 
an unfair erasure; it was the first time in which a legally defined concept of genocide was successfully 
prosecuted. During the trials in Equatorial Guinea genocide was cited as a crime, with a definition based 
on the prior Spanish civil and military definition. Despite the irregularities identified by the Artucio, the 
convictions in Equatorial Guinea have a genuine case to be regarded as the first for genocide. These 
convictions are included in Table 3 along with cases from elsewhere in the world.  
Table 3: Genocide prosecutions pursuant to cases in the rest of the world  
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction 
                                                          
33 Alejandro Artucio. The trial of Macias in Equatorial Guinea: the story of a dictatorship, (International Commission 
of Jurists, 1979)  
34 Ibid. 
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(i) Genocide  
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide 
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide  
(iv) Complicity in genocide 
Date  Name(s) and prosecutor Conviction  Sentence  
Sept 1979 Equatorial Guinea  
Francisco Macías Guema (Former president 
Equatorial guinea) ; Pastor Nsue ;Salvador 
Ondo Ela ; Fortunate Nsogo ; Eduardo 
Nguema Edu ; Miguel Eyegue ; Bienvenido 
Micha Nsue  
The Supreme Military Council of Editorial 
Guinea 
(i) 
 
Death 
 
Dec 2006 Ethiopia 
Mengistu Haile Mariam (former President of 
Ethiopia) ; Legesse Asfaw, known as “the 
butcher of Tigre”; former vice-president 
Fisseha Desta ; former prime minister 
Fikresellassie Wogderes; 51 other 
defendants 
Ethiopian High Court  
(i) Death (a number of the co-
defendants not named here 
had this sentence commuted 
later) 
June 2007 Iraq War (Early 2000’s) 
Ali Hasan Al-Majid (a.k.a. "Chemical Ali") ; 
Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta”i ; Sabir Aziz 
Husayn -al-Duri ; Husayn Rashid 
Muhammad ; Farhan Mutlak Al-Juburi 
Iraqi High Tribunal (Second Criminal Court) 
(i) Ali Hasan Al-Majid ; Sultan 
Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta”i ; Husayn 
Rashid Muhammad - Death 
 
Sabir Aziz Husayn ; Farhan 
Mutlak Al-Juburi - Life 
 
Although there have been a number of successful trials, the relatively low number of convictions outside 
of the Rwanda context highlight the difficulty of achieving successful prosecution in a crime as 
complicated as Genocide, where a dolus specialis (particular intent) of group destruction must be proven. 
This is not the only difficulty in genocide prosecution; the realpolitik of criminal justice, particularly at an 
international level, is such that the intentional bodies investigating and trying Genocide have come under 
considerable scrutiny and, at times, heavy criticism. The next section discusses some of difficulties in 
achieving prosecutions, using the work of ICC in Africa and the case of Sudanese present Omar Al Bashir 
as an example. 
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The politics of Genocide prosecution: A case study on the ICC in Africa 
Of the 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 34 are African states and many of 
these were “deeply involved in creating the Court and all its provisions”.35 Nevertheless, there has been a 
persistent critique of the ICCs role in Africa, much of this from a number of African States claiming that 
the Court “has preoccupied itself with Africa and failed to investigate equally severe conflicts 
elsewhere”.36  Table 4 shows the history of ICC cases, illustrating a preponderance of cases in Africa.  
Although genocide is listed in serval of the cases, convictions to date have been restricted to Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes.  
 
                                                          
35 Franziska Boehme, “’We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court” International journal of transitional Justice , Vol 11, Iss 1 (2017), 50-70 
36 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen, “The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the Prosecutor” 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 309-325 
Table 4: ICC Cases up to January, 2018 
 Africa Asia Europe North 
America 
South 
America 
Investigations not taken 
to preliminary 
examination 
0 1 0 1 1 
Investigations taken to 
preliminary examination 
4 2 3 0 1 
Situations currently under 
investigation 
10 0 1 0 0 
In Trial  
4 0 0 0 0 
Acquitted or charges not 
confirmed 
5 0 0 0 0 
Convicted 
3 0 0 0 0 
Convicted but in Appeal 
2 0 0 0 0 
Source: ICC, 2018b 
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There is a spectrum of positions on the ICCs role in Africa, ranging from accusations of western neo-
colonialism to the application of legislation governing intervention. In the first instance, Abdul Tejan-
Cole37 Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, explains how some have gone so 
far as “to accuse the Court of being a neo-colonialist institution peddling a Western agenda that seeks to 
control African politics through ICC investigations and prosecutions”. For example, Courtenay Griffiths, 
the lead defense attorney for former Liberian President Charles Taylor, argued that rather than operating 
through a desire for international justice, the ICC is acts as “a vehicle for its primarily European funders, 
of which the UK is one of the largest, to exert their power and influence, particularly in Africa” 38. 
Less critical, but still unfavourable interpretations of the ICCs role in Africa assert that the “Achilles heel 
of the ICC system revolves around the fairness of its selection process of its cases”.39  Such arguments 
claim that the ICC suffers from selectivism when deciding which cases to investigate and prosecute. There 
may be many reasons for this, but Imoedemhe40 argues that geopolitical pressures mean that 
“international crimes are ignored when it is considered politically expedient to do so”, and African cases 
are less likely to have the geopolitical influence to assert pressure to this extent.  
Counter arguments to the claims of neo-colonialism and selectivism focus on the application of 
Complimentarity in the Rome Statue, the principle  which stipulates that that it is first and foremost “the 
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”41. 
A further consequence of complimentarity is that it establishes the ICC as a court of last resort that should 
                                                          
37 Abdul Tejan-Cole, “Is the ICC’s exclusively African case docket a legitimate and appropriate intervention or an 
unfair targeting of Africans?” Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016), 366-379. 
38 Courtenay Griffiths. The international Criminal Court is Hurting Africa. (The Telegraph, July 03, 2012) 
39 Geert-Jan Knoops,  An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study (2nd 
edn), Boston:  Brill Nijhoff, (2014) 
40 Ovo Imoedemhe, “Unpacking the tension between the African Union and the international criminal court: the 
way forward”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 23, no1 (2015), 74-105 
41 ICC. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” (2002) 
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only intervene where “the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution”42. Under the complementarity principle, the argument is that clustering of cases in Africa is 
not deliberate, but a consequence of a historical events such as colonialism, wars, and “impunity that 
thrives in a lack of accountability and the rule of law”.43 For those that take this position, such as 
deGuzman, the ICC is simply doing its job, and “all of the Court’s actions to date have been based on 
plausible interpretations of the relevant law”.44  
One of the most persistent critics of the ICC is the African Union, and an example of this is the dispute 
over arrest warrants issued for heads of state of African Union Countries, including Sudanese present 
Omar Al Bashir. At its July 2010 summit, the African union responded to a second arrest warrant for Omar 
Al Bashir for Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity by requesting that its member states 
did not cooperate with the ICC.45 This position was reinforced at an Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, in October 2013, where the African Union stated its “concern on the politicization and misuse of 
indictments against African leaders” reaffirming its position that “no charges shall be commenced or 
continued before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or 
Government”.46 In 2015, the African Union’s Committee of African Ministers on International Criminal 
Court again reiterated their commitment to terminate, suspend, or defer the proceedings against 
President Al Bashir of Sudan and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya until the “concerns and 
proposals for amendments of the Rome Statute of the ICC are considered.47 Since the initial arrest warrant 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Tamfuh Wilson, “The International Criminal Court: Creation, Competence, and Impact in Africa”, African Journal 
of Criminology & Justice Studies, Vol 3, no. 2(2008), 85-123 
44 Margaret deGuzman, “Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately? A Moral, Legal, and Sociological Assessment” 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 333-337  
45 ICC. “Al Bashir Case. The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.” (2017) 
46 African Union. “Extraordinary session of the assembly of the African union 12 October 2013, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia” (2013) 
47 African Union “Meeting of the open-ended Committee of African Ministers on International Criminal Court (ICC), 
New York, USA.” (2015c) 
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in 2009, Al Bashir has visited eight African states that are signatories to the Rome Statute of the ICC 
without arrest: Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, DRC, South Africa and Uganda. Boehme48 suggests 
this has effectively created a “non-cooperation norm” for exercising ICC warrants in Africa. 
As well as the collective opposition from the African Union, individual African states have expressed 
concerns with the workings of ICC. On October 12th, 2016, the Parliament of the Republic of Burundi voted 
in favour of withdrawing from the Rome Statute of the ICC.49 They are not the only nation to have done 
so: South Africa, Kenya, and Gambia have all at some point indicated a desire to withdraw from the statue. 
On October 27th, 2017, Burundi became the first signatory to the Rome Statue to leave the ICC.50 
Despite the disagreements between the African Union, individual states, and the ICC, there is still much 
support for the work of the court. For instance, Keppler51 claims that the African Union “does not reflect 
the range of positions that African governments have regarding the ICC”. This is supported by Boehme52, 
who illustrates how the actions of the African Union created a loyalty conflict in South Africa, where the 
executive is torn between “its obligation to the African Union and its obligation to the ICC”. The South 
African government has been involved for several years in a series of legal challenged around its 
withdrawal from the ICC, which was eventually found by the high court to be “unconstitutional and 
invalid”.53 Furthermore, after South Africa’s 2016 proposed withdrawal from the ICC, Nigeria, DRC, Ivory 
                                                          
48 Franziska Boehme, “’We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court” in International journal of transitional Justice , Vol 11, Iss 1 (2017), 50-70 
49 ICC. ‘statement of the President of the Assembly of States Parties on the process of withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute by Burundi.” (2016b) 
50 European Union. “European Union External Action Service: Statement by the Spokesperson on Burundi and the 
International Criminal Court.” (2017) 
51 Elise Keppler,  Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa, Journal of African Law, vol 56, Iss 
1 (2012) 1-14 
52 Franziska Boehme, “’We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court” in International journal of transitional Justice , Vol 11, Iss 1 (2017), 50-70 
53 BBC. ‘south Africa’s decision to leave ICC ruled “invalid”” (BBC NEWS, February 22, 2017) 
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Coast, Botswana, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Lesotho, and Uganda all publicly backed 
the Court and its work in Africa.54  
Although the ICC faces a difficult role in Africa, there are many who believe “the relationship is still 
salvageable and could be enhanced for the mutual benefit of both institutions with a view to achieving 
the goal of peace and security”.55 Despite  an overbalance in ICC cases in Africa, Bassiouni and Hansen 
argues that this does not mean the ICC should cease investigations here, but that “it needs to also 
investigate and prosecute crimes elsewhere”.56 As table 4 shows, there is evidence that the ICC is 
increasingly focusing its work outside of the African context, with 6 of the 10 preliminary cases in other 
continents. The only current ICC case pursuant to genocide, however, is in Africa.  
Summary  
Since Lemkin’s inception of the crime, definitions for genocide have changed little. The subsequent use of 
Lemkin’s crime in legation was, in the words of the Rome Statute, an international response to the idea 
that there are some crimes so significant that they “shock the conscience of humanity.”57 Nevertheless, 
the legislation is relatively new and the international responses to genocide newer still. Although the ICC 
has yet to convict anyone for Genocide, previous convictions in international, regional, and local courts, 
show that there is a desire to pursue those responsible or complicit in this most serious of crimes. 
Furthermore, bodies such as the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC have a value that can be judged alongside the 
number of convictions for Genocide and the other serious crimes it tries.  Hyearn and Simmons argue that 
the work of the ICC is more nuanced than its record of prosecutions, identifying “multiple mechanisms—
                                                          
54 Human Rights Watch. “Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda.” (2008) 
55 Ovo Imoedemhe, “Unpacking the tension between the African Union and the international criminal court: the 
way forward”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 23, no1 (2015), 74-105 
56  M. Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen, “The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the Prosecutor” 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 309-325 
57 ICC. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” 2002 
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legal and social, international and domestic—associated with the ICC’s authority that can potentially deter 
law violation in countries prone to civil violence”.58  They identify two forms of mutually reinforcing 
deterrent:59 firstly, a prosecution deterrent that derives from both the ICCs investigatory powers and from 
the integration into national laws of the definitions on genocide and associated crimes used by the 
international courts; and secondly, a social deterrent that derives from the ICCs representation of a 
mobilisation in the international community and in domestic civil society. This is supported by Bassiouni 
and Hansen,60 who describe the ICC as “an institution with the capacity to change habits and outcomes” 
and by Hillebrecht61 who argues that the “ICC’s involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on 
the level of mass atrocities committed”. Nevertheless, the presence of the ICC has not stopped what 
Lemkin described over 70 years ago as “an old practice in its modern development”.62 
 
  
                                                          
58 Jo Hyeran and Beth Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” International Organization, 
70, (2016), 443-475 
59 Ibid. 
60 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen, “The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the Prosecutor” 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 309-325 
61 Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya 
International Interactions Vol. 42 , Iss. 4, (2016), 616-643 
62 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal 
for redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) 
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